DCC 2013

Introduction to SIE and 2013 Update

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


Security Information Exchange?

- Old: exclusive sensor/analyst "silos"
- New: compete on execution not data
- Goal: everybody's customers get safer
- Method: mix of public/private channels
- Focus: real time (~DSP), not "batch"
- Motivation: ISC is also an analyst
- Cost: everybody pays what they can afford, often a mix of cash and data




Decentralized - bi-lateral






Centralized - multi-lateral






Data distribution model - original



- SF Bay Area, US (PAIX)
- Main sensor relays
- Some researchers getting feeds off switches




Data distribution model - east++



- DC or NY, US
- Redundant facilities
- More researchers




Data distribution model - relay



- Add relays at exchanges in different countries
- Add local sensors
- Local sharing or tools possible within relay




Data distribution model - future



- Promote node when number of researchers is significant
- Scaling issues




Disparate data





ncap

plug-in filters in action





nmsg

- ftp://ftp.isc.org/isc/nmsg
- Any structured data

•Format:





Google protocol buffers

- <u>http://code.google.com/apis/protocolbuffers</u>
- ■APIs for C, C++, Python, Java, Perl
- Arguably better than XML
- •Why reinvent the wheel?
- Open source
- •Extensible:



nmsg.proto

```
package nmsg;
message Nmsg {
  repeated NmsgPayload payloads = 1;
                                        message NmsgPayload {
message NmsgFragment {
                                          required int32
                                                             vid = 1;
                     id = 1;
  required uint32
                                          required int32
                                                             msgtype = 2;
  required uint32
                     current = 2;
                                          required int64
                                                             time_sec = 3;
  required uint32
                    last = 3;
                                          required fixed32
                                                             time_nsec = 4;
  required bytes
                     fragment = 4;
                                          optional bytes
                                                             payload = 5;
                                          repeated uint32
                                                             user = 6;
```



isc/email.proto

```
package nmsg.isc;
enum EmailType {
  unknown = 0;
  spamtrap = 1; // email sent to a spamtrap
  rejenetwork = 2; // rejected by network or SMTP (pre-DATA) checks
  rej_content = 3; // rejected by content filter (including domain blacklists)
  rej_user = 4; // classified by user as spam
message Email
  optional EmailType type = 8;
  optional bytes headers = 2; // SMTP headers
  optional bytes | srcip = 3; // remote client IP
  optional bytes
                  srchost = 4; // remote client PTR, if known
  optional bytes
                  helo = 5; // HELO/EHLO parameter
  optional bytes
                  from = 6; // MAIL FROM parameter (brackets stripped)
  repeated bytes
                   rcpt = 7; // RCPT TO parameter(s) (brackets stripped)
  repeated bytes
                   bodyurl = 9; // URL(s) found in decoded body
          DCC 2013
                               Copyright © 2013 Internet Systems Consortium
```



Conficker Sinkhole Example

- We generate the DNS content and run the DNS servers; instrument w/ NMSG
- We run the HTTP → NMSG servers
- These NMSG flows are relayed into SIE
- The CWG server copies these files into per-analyst directories for use w/ rsync
- SIE-connected analysts get it real time



Ghost Click Example

- We ran the replacement DNS servers, instrumented with NMSG (queries only)
- Batched for up to one minute to save bandwidth and allow for encryption
- SIE analysts got the data immediately
- We stored copies of the NMSG as files
- Others had to periodically poll (rsync)



Darknet Example

- Sometimes called "network telescope"
- IP space known in BGP but not used
- Internet cosmic background radiation
- Exception to our "always NMSG" rule
- Any BGP speaking router can be a sensor: replace Null0 with GRE0
- We need more/smaller sensors (many)



Important Takeaways, SIE/NMSG

- It's all real time, but files can be made
- Network of private Ethernet switches
- Most analysts provide or rent a server
- ~25 channels today, some private
- ~40 analysts: comm/acad/police
- ~500Mbit/sec today, some reprocessed
- SIE pricing is "nondiscriminatory"
- We want more data and more analysts



Motivation to Participate

- Operator: run a single kind of sensor, let us deliver to all qualified parties
- Analyst: receive a firehose of real time data in a simple binary format
- Us: offer cash discount on services to analysts who can bring data (+DNSDB)
- Economy: lowers total cost of visibility, aligns individual motives with society's
- "Snowball effect"



Comparison to uSoft DCU's SaaS

- Sinkhole as a Service (SaaS)
- Capture botnet C&C, parse all "hits"
- Subscribers are network operators
- Each subscriber provides "Azure" creds
- DCU team populates Azure, many files
- Currently handles ~100m per day
- Compressed text files easy to use
- DCU data is free; Azure is very cheap



Questions?

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